Towards a Phenomenological Understanding of Disembodiment in Schizophrenia

Abstract

Abstract The aim of this paper is to analyse the experience of disembodiment in light of Husserl’s phenomenology. Given that disembodiment is characterized by a diminished sense of body ownership, it is usually interpreted in a Cartesian manner as involving a mind-body dichotomy. Contrary to this view, firstly, I argue that the dualist interpretation of disembodiment is phenomenologically untenable, because it is incompatible with experiencing one’s alienation in an embodied way. Secondly, I endorse the interpretation of body disownership in terms of multisensory disintegration, and provide a Husserlian reading of this experience by distinguishing among distinct senses of spatiality that are specific to different sense-fields. Specifically, I claim that distinct sense-fields harbour particular centres of orientation, and thus a split between these sense-fields leaves the subject with the discordant sense of inhabiting different points of orientation. Thirdly, I focus on the perturbed sense of spatiality that arises from (i) a vision that is extricated from touch, and (ii) a touch that disengages from vision. Finally, I conclude by stating some limitations of this article, while also suggesting some prospects for further advancements.