Which Kind of Body in “Mental” Pathologies? Phenomenological Insights on the Nature of the Disrupted Self
The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine April 1, 2023 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhad008 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 10 |
| Key points | Argues that a corporeal consciousness should be taken into account by clinicians, especially in mental disorders, and proposes that schizophrenia, melancholic depression, and autism spectrum disorder correspond to three forms of bodily existence: disembodiment, chrematization, and dyssynchrony. Contends that an expressive common environment between patient and clinician is important and that therapy's primary goal is a shared understanding of the patient's life-world, expressed through the disrupted body. |
Abstract
Guided by a phenomenological perspective, this paper aims to account for the existence of a corporeal consciousness-something that clinicians should take into account, not merely in the case of physical pathologies but especially in the case of mental disorders. Firstly, I will highlight three cases: schizophrenia, depression, and autism spectrum disorder. Then, I will show how these cases correspond to three different kinds of bodily existence: disembodiment (in the case of schizophrenia), chrematization (in melancholic depression), and dyssynchrony (in the autism spectrum disorder). Finally, I will argue for the importance of an "expressive common environment" between the patient and the clinician, who are two distinct, embodied conscious subjects resonating with one another. In this view, the primary goal of the therapeutic process seems to develop a shared understanding of the patient's life-world, which finds its main expression through the disrupted body.