Towards a Phenomenological Understanding of Disembodiment in Schizophrenia
Husserl Studies March 14, 2026 DOI: 10.1007/s10743-026-09369-7 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractDisembodiment—a diminished sense of body ownership—is often interpreted as a Cartesian mind-body split. This paper argues that such a dualist interpretation is phenomenologically untenable because experiencing alienation is itself an embodied process. Instead, it endorses a multisensory disintegration account, offering a Husserlian reading that distinguishes different senses of spatiality specific to distinct sense-fields. Each sense-field has its own centre of orientation, so a split between them leaves the subject with discordant points of orientation. The analysis focuses on vision extricated from touch and touch disengaged from vision, concluding with limitations and prospects for further research.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Embodied cognition Phenomenology philosophy Interpretation philosophy Subject documents Focus optics |
| Key finding | Argues that the dualist interpretation of disembodiment is phenomenologically untenable and proposes a Husserlian reading of body disownership in terms of multisensory disintegration, where distinct sense-fields have particular centers of orientation. |
Abstract
Abstract The aim of this paper is to analyse the experience of disembodiment in light of Husserl’s phenomenology. Given that disembodiment is characterized by a diminished sense of body ownership, it is usually interpreted in a Cartesian manner as involving a mind-body dichotomy. Contrary to this view, firstly, I argue that the dualist interpretation of disembodiment is phenomenologically untenable, because it is incompatible with experiencing one’s alienation in an embodied way. Secondly, I endorse the interpretation of body disownership in terms of multisensory disintegration, and provide a Husserlian reading of this experience by distinguishing among distinct senses of spatiality that are specific to different sense-fields. Specifically, I claim that distinct sense-fields harbour particular centres of orientation, and thus a split between these sense-fields leaves the subject with the discordant sense of inhabiting different points of orientation. Thirdly, I focus on the perturbed sense of spatiality that arises from (i) a vision that is extricated from touch, and (ii) a touch that disengages from vision. Finally, I conclude by stating some limitations of this article, while also suggesting some prospects for further advancements.