The Falsification Thinking in Consciousness Research

Consciousness cannot be definitively explained by dualistic theories that separate it from matter, nor by reductionist theories that equate it solely with neurobiological processes. This article argues for a falsification-based approach to define what consciousness is not: it is not a purely spiritual phenomenon, not merely a neurobiological process, and not the most fundamental component of systemic structures. Instead, consciousness may emerge as a product of complexity arising from dynamic interactions among neurons, or from interactions between neurons and the external world within large-scale complex systems.

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Abstract

What is consciousness? Even to this day, human knowledge still cannot provide a definitive answer to this question. Dualistic theories, which separate consciousness from matter, and reductionist theories, which reduce consciousness to neurobiological processes, encounter unsolvable dilemmas when attempting to answer what consciousness is. Starting from a perspective of falsification-based thinking and drawing upon existing philosophical and neurobiological research, this article attempts to answer what consciousness not is. It points out that: (1) consciousness is not an absolute mind or purely spiritual phenomenon; (2) consciousness is not purely a neurobiological process; and (3) consciousness is not the most fundamental component of systemic structures. On this basis, a preliminary exploration of the possible generation mechanism of consciousness is carried out. Consciousness may be the product of the complexity generated by the dynamic interactions among neurons, or by the interplay between neurons and the external world within large-scale complex systems.