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Dream experiences and the neural correlates of perceptual consciousness and cognitive access.

Peter Fazekas, Georgina Nemeth

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences September 19, 2018 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0356 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Dreaming
Keywords Cognitive access Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex Posterior hot zone White dreams
Key points Argues that cognitive access is not a monolithic phenomenon and that a form of cognitive access may operate without dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activity, making exclusive posterior activation potentially compatible with the claim that perceptual consciousness requires cognitive access.

Abstract

This paper approaches the debate whether perceptual consciousness requires cognitive access from the perspective of dream studies, and investigates what kind of findings could support the opposing views of this debate. Two kinds of arguments are discussed, one that claims that the hypoactivity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in rapid eye movement sleep is directly relevant, and another that proposes that locating the neural correlates of dream experiences can indirectly inform the debate. It is argued that under closer reflection, neither the classical claim about dorsolateral prefrontal cortex hypoactivity nor the more recent emphasis on general posterior hot zone activity during dreaming stand up to scrutiny. White dreaming is identified as the phenomenon that, nevertheless, holds the most promise to have an impact on the debate. Going beyond the topic if studying dreams can contribute to this debate, it is argued that cognitive access is not a monolithic phenomenon, and its neural correlates are not well understood. There seems to be a relevant form of cognitive access that can operate in the absence of activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and maybe also in the whole frontal region. If so, then exclusive posterior activation during conscious experiences might very well be compatible with the hypothesis that perceptual consciousness requires cognitive access.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

Comparable studies

Other theoretical and historical papers on dreaming, most cited first.

Study Year Design Participants
Dreaming: a conceptual framework for philosophy of mind and empirical research 2016 Theoretical or philosophical paper
Metaphor and hyperassociativity: the imagination mechanisms behind emotion assimilation in sleep and dreaming 2015 Theoretical or philosophical paper
Varieties of Lucid Dreaming Experience 2000 Theoretical or philosophical paper
Experimental Research on Dreaming: State of the Art and Neuropsychoanalytic Perspectives 2011 Theoretical or philosophical paper
The Neurobiology of Consciousness: Lucid Dreaming Wakes Up 2009 Theoretical or philosophical paper

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