No Substitute for Functionalism -- A Reply to 'Falsification & Consciousness'
Natesh Ganesh
arXiv Preprint Archive May 28, 2020 preprint
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Cs.oh Cs.ai Functionalism functionalist theories Ai functionalism Deep learning Connectionism Robustness of theories Foundational strength |
| Key points | Argues that substitutions do not exist for a broad class of Level-1 functionalist theories, rendering them immune to the substitution argument that would pre-falsify them. |
Abstract
In their paper 'Falsification and Consciousness' [1], Kleiner and Hoel introduced a formal mathematical model of the process of generating observable data from experiments and using that data to generate inferences and predictions onto an experience space. The resulting substitution argument built on this framework was used to show that any theory of consciousness with independent inference and prediction data are pre-falsified, if the inference reports are considered valid. If this argument does indeed pre-falsify many of the leading theories of consciousness, it would indicate a fundamental problem affecting the field of consciousness as a whole that would require radical changes to how consciousness science is performed. In this reply, the author will identify avenues of expansion for the model proposed in [1], allowing us to distinguish between different types of variation. Motivated by examples from neural networks, state machines and Turing machines, we will prove that substitutions do not exist for a very broad class of Level-1 functionalist theories, rendering them immune to the aforementioned substitution argument.
Comparable studies
Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.
| Study | Year | Design | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. | 2003 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| From dopamine to salience to psychosis--linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. | 2005 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |