Is our brain hardwired to produce God, or is our brain hardwired to perceive God? A systematic review on the role of the brain in mediating religious experience.
Alexander A Fingelkurts, Andrew A Fingelkurts
Cognitive processing November 1, 2009 DOI: 10.1007/s10339-009-0261-3 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe human brain is not simply hardwired to believe in God or to perceive God; instead, consciousness, mind, and spirit are different sides of the same phenomenon as brain, body, and matter, neither reducible to the other. Mental agency is neither identical with nor reducible to brain processes and exerts downward causal influence on brain plasticity and functioning. The paper suggests a methodological shift from explaining religious experience to describing it, integrating physical, biological, psychological, and spiritual dimensions of human existence. This contributes to the ongoing discussion among theologians, cognitive psychologists, and neuroscientists.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Systematic critical review Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Consciousness, mind, and spirit are not reducible to brain processes, and mental agency exerts downward causal influence on brain functioning. |
Abstract
To figure out whether the main empirical question "Is our brain hardwired to believe in and produce God, or is our brain hardwired to perceive and experience God?" is answered, this paper presents systematic critical review of the positions, arguments and controversies of each side of the neuroscientific-theological debate and puts forward an integral view where the human is seen as a psycho-somatic entity consisting of the multiple levels and dimensions of human existence (physical, biological, psychological, and spiritual reality), allowing consciousness/mind/spirit and brain/body/matter to be seen as different sides of the same phenomenon, neither reducible to each other. The emergence of a form of causation distinctive from physics where mental/conscious agency (a) is neither identical with nor reducible to brain processes and (b) does exert "downward" causal influence on brain plasticity and the various levels of brain functioning is discussed. This manuscript also discusses the role of cognitive processes in religious experience and outlines what can neuroscience offer for study of religious experience and what is the significance of this study for neuroscience, clinicians, theology and philosophy. A methodological shift from "explanation" to "description" of religious experience is suggested. This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion between theologians, cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists.