Computation, consciousness, and “computation and consciousness”

Abstract

Video games are a kind of physical computation, and the point holds true of computation more generally. Computationalism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal properties supervene on computational ones – that is, that being the right kind of computer is enough to be conscious. The mechanism of action of inhalational anesthetics remains something of a scientific puzzle, especially given the ability of chemically inert gasses like xenon to remove consciousness at high concentrations. Tim Maudlin&s;s work bears an important relationship to various &s;exploding implementation&s; arguments, which claim that any sufficiently complex object can implement any finite-state automaton. Maudlin&s;s argument does not require exploding implementation to be true, however. Indeed, he presupposes that appropriate counterfactual restrictions are sufficient to avoid explosions. Maudlin&s;s argument, by contrast, reads computationalism more narrowly as the claim that some Turing machine can be conscious.