Computational and Thought Language: Beyond The Searle-Dennet Paradigm
Muhammad Andry Mukmin, Luh Gede Saraswati Putri, Abby Gina Boang Manalu
Jurnal Filsafat October 16, 2025 DOI: 10.22146/jf.105975 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that artificial intelligence can produce only "computational language"—syntactic and algorithmic, without intentionality—while "thought language," rooted in phenomenological consciousness, cannot be reduced to computational operations. Neurocognitive evidence such as Broca's area activation is said to support the computational account, whereas thought language is positioned as an ontological construct beyond empirical verification. |
Abstract
This study examines the ontological tension in the debate between John R. Searle and Daniel C. Dennett regarding the relationship between language and consciousness, and then proposes the model of computational language and thought language as a new analytical framework. Computational language is understood as a syntactic, algorithm-based language without intentionality. Conversely, thought language is a conceptual-intentional expression rooted in phenomenological consciousness. Through a conceptual-critical analysis, this study demonstrates that artificial intelligence can only produce computational language, whereas thought language cannot be reduced to computational operations. Neurocognitive evidence, such as activation of Broca’s area in syntactic processing, supports the description of computational language, while thought language remains positioned as an ontological construct beyond empirical verification. This model not only maps the epistemic limits of artificial intelligence but also opens new avenues for reflection in the philosophy of mind, language, and technology.