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Controlling phenomenology by being unaware of intentions

Zoltan Dienes, Bence Pálfi, Peter Lush

July 23, 2020 preprint DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/4zw6g_v1 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Review
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Phenomenology philosophy Cognitive psychology Epistemology
Citations 1
Key findings Phenomenological control is a trait ability to construct subjective experiences according to situational requirements, produced by intentionally creating first-order states while thinking one is not so intending.

Abstract

This chapter reviews evidence that people have, to a varying degree, a trait ability to control phenomenology; that is, to construct subjective experiences according to situational requirements. The experiences can be subjectively compelling ones of involuntariness (for actually intentional movements); of perceptions (that grossly misrepresent reality); and of having beliefs (that in fact one only pretends to have, e.g. being of the opposite gender). Phenomenological control produces the neural and physiological processes that underlie having the subjective experiences. We argue that phenomenological control is best understood by distinguishing first order states from higher order thoughts; in particular, phenomenological control is produced by intentionally creating the required first order states while thinking one is not so intending. Phenomenological control can be used in any context where having a subjective experience would help convince yourself and others that you share group values. It can be used in a hypnotic context to create hypnotic responses. But it can also be used in the context of psychological experiments to construct the phenomena postulated by the researcher where those phenomena are suggested by demand characteristics.

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