Which cortical computations underlie consciousness?
Cerebral Cortex August 18, 2016 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198784852.003.0022 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that a higher order syntactic monitoring operation, which works through the steps of a multi-step plan to locate and correct faulty steps, may be the type of adaptive computation that feels like something. The author presents this as a plausible argument that cannot be proved, and notes that much human processing is unconscious and not verbally reportable. |
Abstract
Consciousness, and especially phenomenal consciousness (why it should feel like something), is a ‘hard’ problem in philosophy. It is not clear that it is amenable to a solution using neuroscience, but neuroscience does have many relevant and potential contributions to understanding phenomenal consciousness. It is argued that one route to action is the goal-directed route, with the goals set by the selfish genes. A second route involves multi-step reasoning involving syntax to keep the different variables and steps in the plan separate and organised (see Chapter 17). This multi-step planning may suffer a credit assignment problem, in that when the plan fails, it is not clear which step or steps were faulty. In this situation it is proposed that a monitoring system with syntactic capability would be useful to work through the steps of the plan, to work out which the faulty step in the plan might be, and to correct the plan. It is suggested, but only as a plausible argument that cannot be proved, that this higher order syntactic monitoring operation might be the type of computation, with adaptive value, that might feel like something. This is Rolls’ higher order syntactic thought (HOST) theory of consciousness. It is a theory of the computations that underlie consciousness, and that type of approach does seem promising. Much processing in humans can be unconscious, and cannot be verbally reported. It may operate without the involvement of the necessarily slow HOST system with its sequential syntax. The brain does not operate as a deterministic system, because of spiking-related neuronal noise in the brain (Chapter 5). However, when the reasoning system is taking the decision, we might wish to use the term ‘free will’ to describe the operation being performed by the cortex. Other approaches to consciousness include Rosenthal’s higher order thought (HOT) theory; that oscillations somehow account for consciousness; that sensing bodily changes is required for consciousness; and that consciousness is related to operations in a global workspace.