Reporting and Subjectivity Traps: A Brief Opinion Article on Consciousness as Belief

Abstract

This work examines what we consider to be the two main limitations in consciousness science: the reliance on subjective reporting and the assumption of a coherent self. We propose that consciousness may function more as a belief system than an empirically verifiable fact, shaped by the subjective nature of experience and constrained by how we report it. Lacking objective evidence beyond self-reports, even advanced machines might mimic conscious behaviour under specific conditions. Concepts like phenomenological zombies—beings physically identical to us but devoid of consciousness—highlight the challenge of distinguishing true conscious experience from mere behavioural mimicry. Experimental designs frequently conflate metacognition (beliefs about perception) with consciousness itself, as seen in Higher-Order Thought theories. These frameworks suggest that our sense of being conscious may stem from metacognitive processes, often resulting in cognitive biases. Studies on brain regions associated with metacognitive accuracy further blur the distinction between consciousness and belief. Additionally, phenomena like delusional misidentification syndromes challenge the assumption of a stable, coherent self that reliably perceives and reports reality. By interrogating these assumptions, we reconsider consciousness not as an inherent property, but as an adaptive construct shaped to enhance survival. This perspective calls for a reevaluation of the fundamental nature of consciousness and the correct approach to studying it.