A Teleological Theory of the Mind
Realism Regained November 16, 2000 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780195135671.003.0016 (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThis chapter examines several problems in the philosophy of mind—downward causation, qualia, and free will—and briefly discusses how a teleological theory of mental representation might address them. The discussion begins with Descartes, who crystallized the modern mind/body problem by arguing for radical dualism: the mind and body are separate substances, one characterized by thought and the other by extension.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that a teleological theory of mental representation is relevant to problems in the philosophy of mind, including downward causation, qualia, and free will. |
Abstract
Abstract In this chapter, I want to look at a number of problems in the philosophy of mind, and discuss briefly the relevance of a teleological theory of mental representation to these problems, including downward causation, qualia, and free will. It’s inevitable that a discussion of the mind/body problem begin with Descartes. It was Descartes who crystallized the mind/body problem as it exists for the modern mind. Descartes’s view, of course, is radically dualistic: the mind and body are two separate substances, with radically different essences (the one, thought, and the other, extension).