Mind in Philosophy
Joe Gough
October 19, 2026 DOI: 10.1093/9780197836088.003.0015 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that some areas of philosophy of mind rest on subtly dualistic assumptions, holding explanations of mental phenomena to higher standards than other explanations and than explanations generally are in the sciences. The chapter also argues against a particular, influential view of philosophy of mind and examines the field's subject matter and aims. |
Abstract
Abstract This chapter considers philosophy of mind. It considers the significance of this book’s thesis for philosophy of mind. It focuses initially on the ‘mark of the mental’, the attempt to identifying the core feature of ‘mental’ phenomena, and the ‘mind–body problem’. It then aims to draw out some subtly dualistic assumptions that shape some areas of philosophy of mind, where explanations of ‘mental’ phenomena are held to higher standards than other explanations, and than explanations generally are in the sciences. It considers what philosophy of mind is, what its subject matter is, and what its aims are. It argues against a particular, influential view of philosophy of mind.
Citations in the library
Cites 12
- Radicalizing Enactivism The MIT Press eBooks December 14, 2012
- The Computational Boundary of a “Self”: Developmental Bioelectricity Drives Multicellularity and Scale-Free Cognition Frontiers in Psychology December 13, 2019
- The methodological puzzle of phenomenal consciousness. Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences September 19, 2018
- Situated Neural Representations: Solving the Problems of Content. Frontiers in Neurorobotics 2022
- Beyond the serotonin deficit hypothesis: communicating a neuroplasticity framework of major depressive disorder. Molecular Psychiatry December 1, 2024
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