Analytic philosophers of mind seemingly take the hard problem of consciousness to be the only aspect of the mind-body problem that has not been in principle solved. But phenomenal consciousness is not the only puzzling and mysterious mental phenomena. The capacity of our minds to have contents — to “be about” or “of” objects, and to represent them — is also puzzling and mysterious. And whilst,...
This paper contributes to, and underpins, the project of an integrative account of psychological and bodily self-consciousness. Following a trend in the literature that uses the notion of “ownership” to discuss self-consciousness, and adapting José Luis Bermúdez’s terminology, I refer to psychological self-consciousness as “ψ-ownership” and to bodily self-consciousness as “φ-ownership.” The...
The Structure of Appearance presents a phenomenalist system which constructs enduring visible objects out of qualia. Nevertheless Goodman does not espouse phenomenalism. Why not? In answering this question this paper explicates Goodman's views about the nature and functions of constructional systems, the prospects of reductionism, and the character of epistemology.