Transparency and Subjective Character
Self-Experience February 2, 2023 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198805397.003.0004 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that subjective character conflicts with the transparency of perceptual experience and that depersonalization evidence does not support its existence. |
Abstract
AbstractIn this chapter, I argue that subjective character, if it is phenomenologically substantial, conflicts with the transparency of perceptual experience. More specifically, if subjective character accompanies all conscious states, then it should exist in unreflective perceptual states. These states, however, appear transparent and there is no room for self-referential phenomenology on the unreflective level. I end the chapter by considering an empirical argument for the existence of subjective character based on depersonalization, and I argue that the best interpretation of patient reports is consistent with a lack of subjective character.
Citations in the library
Cited by 2
Cites 3
- On a confusion about a function of consciousness Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory Philosophical Psychology September 27, 2011
- I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2017