Active inference, enactivism and the hermeneutics of social cognition.
Synthese January 1, 2018 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1269-8 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThree philosophical views on predictive models in neuroscience are distinguished: predictive coding, which relies on internal Bayesian models and prediction error minimization; predictive processing, linked to radical connectionism and simple embodiment; and predictive engagement, aligned with enactivist approaches to cognition. The concept of active inference is examined under each model, and its implications for social cognition are explored. The authors consider Frith and Friston's proposal for a neural hermeneutics and contrast it with an enactivist hermeneutics, offering an alternative account of how social understanding might work.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Active inference Enactivism Free energy principle Hermeneutics Predictive coding |
| Citations | 221 |
| Key finding | Argues that three distinct philosophical views—predictive coding, predictive processing, and predictive engagement—lead to different accounts of active inference and social cognition, and contrasts neural hermeneutics with enactivist hermeneutics. |
Abstract
We distinguish between three philosophical views on the neuroscience of predictive models: predictive coding (associated with internal Bayesian models and prediction error minimization), predictive processing (associated with radical connectionism and 'simple' embodiment) and predictive engagement (associated with enactivist approaches to cognition). We examine the concept of active inference under each model and then ask how this concept informs discussions of social cognition. In this context we consider Frith and Friston's proposal for a neural hermeneutics, and we explore the alternative model of enactivist hermeneutics.