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Active inference, enactivism and the hermeneutics of social cognition.

Shaun Gallagher, Micah Allen

Synthese 2018 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1269-8 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Active inference Enactivism Free energy principle Hermeneutics Predictive coding Social cognition
Citations 221
Key points Argues that three distinct philosophical views—predictive coding, predictive processing, and predictive engagement—lead to different accounts of active inference and social cognition, and contrasts neural hermeneutics with enactivist hermeneutics.

Abstract

We distinguish between three philosophical views on the neuroscience of predictive models: predictive coding (associated with internal Bayesian models and prediction error minimization), predictive processing (associated with radical connectionism and 'simple' embodiment) and predictive engagement (associated with enactivist approaches to cognition). We examine the concept of active inference under each model and then ask how this concept informs discussions of social cognition. In this context we consider Frith and Friston's proposal for a neural hermeneutics, and we explore the alternative model of enactivist hermeneutics.

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