Temporal naturalism
arXiv Preprint Archive October 31, 2013 via arXiv
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractTwo people may both call themselves naturalists yet hold fundamentally different views about time, laws of nature, and the role of mathematics in physics. These differences rarely affect ordinary science, which studies small subsystems against a fixed background, but become critical when considering the entire universe, where no such background exists. The key divide is the conception of time: temporal naturalism holds that the succession of present moments is real and that laws of nature evolve, while timeless naturalism treats laws as immutable and the present moment as an illusion.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Physics.hist-ph |
| Key finding | Argues that temporal naturalism is empirically more adequate than timeless naturalism for addressing major puzzles in cosmology and physics, and can accommodate qualia as intrinsic qualities of matter. |
Abstract
Two people may claim both to be naturalists, but have divergent conceptions of basic elements of the natural world which lead them to mean different things when they talk about laws of nature, or states, or the role of mathematics in physics. These disagreements do not much affect the ordinary practice of science which is about small subsystems of the universe, described or explained against a background, idealized to be fixed. But these issues become crucial when we consider including the whole universe within our system, for then there is no fixed background to reference observables to. I argue here that the key issue responsible for divergent versions of naturalism and divergent approaches to cosmology is the conception of time. One version, which I call temporal naturalism, holds that time, in the sense of the succession of present moments, is real, and that laws of nature evolve in that time. This is contrasted with timeless naturalism, which holds that laws are immutable and the present moment and its passage are illusions. I argue that temporal naturalism is empirically more adequate than the alternatives, because it offers testable explanations for puzzles its rivals cannot address, and is likely a better basis for solving major puzzles that presently face cosmology and physics. This essay also addresses the problem of qualia and experience within naturalism and argues that only temporal naturalism can make a place for qualia as intrinsic qualities of matter.