From Murphy’s Christian Physicalism to Lowe’s Dualism

Nancey Murphy argues that God created humans as purely physical beings without immortal souls, claiming neuroscience explains the mind better through physical information processing than dualist theories can. The authors reply that Murphy overestimates neuroscience's ability to explain qualia, unity, privacy, and causality of the mind, and underestimates dualism. They argue that E. J. Lowe's version of dualism offers better explanations, often with experimental support and in testable ways. Thus, Murphy's physicalism actually highlights the value of Lowe's dualism today.

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Abstract

Nancey Murphy argues that God created us as physical beings without immortal souls. She supports this Christian physicalism by arguing that neuroscience can better explain minds in terms of physical information processing than dualists can in problematic nonphysical terms. We reply that Murphy overestimates neuroscience and underestimates dualism. She doesn’t show how neuroscience can explain the mind’s characteristic qualia, unity, privacy, or causality. We argue that Lowe’s dualism can better explain minds, often with experimental support and in testable ways. Murphy’s physicalism thus serves to highlight the value of Lowe’s dualism today.