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Mostyn Jones

3 papers in the library · 28 citations · publishing 2021-2024

Papers

Electromagnetic-field theories of qualia: can they improve upon standard neuroscience?

Front Psychol June 1, 2023 Mostyn Jones, Tam Hunt 17 citations

The brain's production of conscious qualities like colors and pains remains unexplained by standard neuroscience, which focuses on synaptic information processing and spike codes. Electromagnetic field theories offer a promising alternative, proposing that brain-generated electromagnetic fields, rather than synaptic firing alone, give rise to qualia. This review evaluates several such theories, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses compared to standard approaches, and concludes that EM-field accounts provide more viable explanations for how qualia arise and unify into complex perceptions.

Editorial: Electromagnetic field theories of consciousness: opportunities and obstacles.

Front Hum Neurosci March 1, 2024 Tam Hunt, Mostyn Jones, Johnjoe Mcfadden et al. 11 citations

This editorial examines the potential of electromagnetic field theories to explain consciousness, highlighting both promising avenues and significant challenges. It discusses how neural electromagnetic fields might integrate information across brain regions, offering a framework for conscious experience. However, it also addresses obstacles such as the lack of direct causal evidence and difficulties in testing these theories empirically. The piece calls for interdisciplinary collaboration to refine hypotheses and develop experimental approaches that could bridge theoretical gaps.

From Murphy’s Christian Physicalism to Lowe’s Dualism

TheoLogica July 21, 2021 Mostyn Jones, Eric LaRock

Nancey Murphy argues that God created humans as purely physical beings without immortal souls, claiming neuroscience explains the mind better through physical information processing than dualist theories can. The authors reply that Murphy overestimates neuroscience's ability to explain qualia, unity, privacy, and causality of the mind, and underestimates dualism. They argue that E. J. Lowe's version of dualism offers better explanations, often with experimental support and in testable ways. Thus, Murphy's physicalism actually highlights the value of Lowe's dualism today.