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Mostyn Jones

4 papers in the library · 45 citations · publishing 2021-2024

Papers

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A Simple, Testable Mind–Body Solution?

Journal of Consciousness Studies February 1, 2024 Mostyn Jones

Neuroelectrical panpsychism (NP) offers a clear, simple, testable mind–body solution. It says that everything is at least minimally conscious, and electrical activity across separate neurons creates a unified, intelligent mind. NP draws on recent experimental evidence to address the easy problem of specifying the mind's neural correlates. These correlates are neuroelectrical activities that,...

Fields or firings? Comparing the spike code and the electromagnetic field hypothesis

Frontiers in Psychology July 20, 2023 Tam Hunt, Mostyn Jones 28 citations

Where is consciousness? Neurobiological theories of consciousness look primarily to synaptic firing and "spike codes" as the physical substrate of consciousness, although the specific mechanisms of consciousness remain unknown. Synaptic firing results from electrochemical processes in neuron axons and dendrites. All neurons also produce electromagnetic (EM) fields due to various mechanisms,...

Electromagnetic-field theories of qualia: can they improve upon standard neuroscience?

Frontiers in Psychology June 1, 2023 Mostyn Jones, Tam Hunt 17 citations

How do brains create all our different colors, pains, and other conscious qualities? These various qualia are the most essential aspects of consciousness. Yet standard neuroscience (primarily based on synaptic information processing) has not found the synaptic-firing codes, sometimes described as the “spike code,” to account for how these qualia arise and how they unite to form complex...

From Murphy’s Christian Physicalism to Lowe’s Dualism

TheoLogica July 21, 2021 Mostyn Jones, Eric LaRock

Nancey Murphy argues that God created us as physical beings without immortal souls. She supports this Christian physicalism by arguing that neuroscience can better explain minds in terms of physical information processing than dualists can in problematic nonphysical terms. We reply that Murphy overestimates neuroscience and underestimates dualism. She doesn’t show how neuroscience can explain...

DOI: 10.14428/thl.v5i2.56273 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Christian physicalism Non-cartesian substance dualism E. j. lowe