A Defence of the Resemblance Meaning of ‘What it’s like’
Mind July 18, 2017 DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzx023 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 10 |
| Key points | Argues that the philosophical consensus treating 'is like' in 'what it is like' as not meaning 'resembles' is mistaken. The paper contends that an 'affective' analysis fails, that the property account is compatible with the resemblance analysis, and that the meaning of 'what it's like' has no special bearing on consciousness, with deflationary implications for the 'hard problem' of consciousness. |
Abstract
Abstract It is often held to be definitive of consciousness that there is something it is like to be in a conscious state. A consensus has arisen that ‘is like’ in relevant ‘what it is like’ locutions does not mean ‘resembles’. This paper argues that the consensus is mistaken. It is argued that a recently proposed ‘affective’ analysis of these locutions fails, but that a purported rival of the resemblance analysis, the property account, is in fact compatible with it. Some of the implications of this argument are briefly explored: it is suggested that the meaning of ‘what it’s like’ does not, in itself, have any special bearing on consciousness, and that the implications for the so-called ‘hard problem’ of consciousness are deflationary.