1. Why the mystery?
Oxford University Press eBooks September 14, 2017 DOI: 10.1093/actrade/9780198794738.003.0001 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that there is no generally agreed definition of consciousness, surveying approaches from Descartes's Cartesian dualism to Chalmers's "hard problem" and Nagel's "What is it like to be a bat?", and discussing subjectivity, qualia, and Dennett's ideas. |
Abstract
What is consciousness? What does it do? Could we have evolved without it? ‘Why the mystery?’ considers the definition of consciousness and how psychologists, neuroscientists, and philosophers have tried to explain it. From the Cartesian dualism of René Descartes to the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness, a phrase coined in 1994 by the Australian philosopher David Chalmers, and the question ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ of American philosopher Thomas Nagel, it is shown that there is no generally agreed definition of consciousness. Subjectivity (or phenomenality), qualia, and the ideas of philosopher Daniel Dennett are also discussed.