Comparison of the Actual Theories of Consciousness: Back to the Hard Problem

Comparing theories of consciousness from different fields is challenging. This article argues that the best criterion for comparison is not a list of interconnected questions but how directly a theory addresses the Hard Problem of Consciousness—how the brain generates subjective experience. Using this criterion, 20 theories of consciousness developed since the 1960s were examined. Only some theories actually answer the Hard Problem, and this often conflicts with the authors' own views. The approach excludes theories that deny the importance of either the brain or subjective experience. Better criteria for comparing consciousness theories will require a more precise evaluation system tied to the original problem.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Responding to the relevance of the problem of consciousness for modern interdisciplinary research, this article is devoted to finding an answer to the question of what criteria can be used to compare different theories of consciousness, including those created within various fields of knowledge, for example, philosophy of con-sciousness and neurocognitive science. Based on a comparison of several review papers from the past 15 years, it was shown that such a criterion may not be a list of numerous, interconnected, and therefore challeng-ing, questions for theories of consciousness, but rather how the theories in question directly address the Hard Problem of Consciousness – the problem of how the brain generates subjective experience. At the next stage, based on this criterion, 20 relevant theories of consciousness (developed since the 1960s to date) were con-sidered and analyzed, presented in this text in the order of their appearance and publication. As a result, it was shown that only in some of these theories one can see the answer to the problem posed by D. Chalmers, which is not always consistent with the opinion of the authors of the theories of consciousness themselves. Further-more, this approach excludes from consideration theories that deny the significance of each of their compo-nents – the brain or subjective experience. The results indicate that further development of criteria for compar-ing theories of consciousness generated in various fields of knowledge requires the development of a more precise system for evaluating the theories under consideration relative to the formulation of the original prob-lem.