The disunity of consciousness
Australasian Journal of Philosophy September 1, 1998 DOI: 10.1080/00048409812348511 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Allegiance Epistemology Subject documents Mechanism biology Cognitive science Politics Law |
| Citations | 33 |
| Key points | Argues that phenomenal consciousness is not a unified single thing but a multiplicity of elements from distinct neural mechanisms, requiring a multi-track computational theory. |
Abstract
It is commonplace for both philosophers and cognitive scientists to express their allegiance to the “unity of consciousness”. This is the claim that a subject’s phenomenal consciousness, at any one moment in time, is a single thing. This view has had a major influence on computational theories of consciousness. In particular, what we call single-track theories dominate the literature, theories which contend that our conscious experience is the result of a single consciousness-making process or mechanism in the brain. We argue that the orthodox view is quite wrong: phenomenal experience is not a unity, in the sense of being a single thing at each instant. It is a multiplicity, an aggregate of phenomenal elements, each of which is the product of a distinct consciousness-making mechanism in the brain. Consequently, cognitive science is in need of a multi-track theory of consciousness; a computational model that acknowledges both the manifold nature of experience, and its distributed neural basis. 1.