What does decoding from the PFC reveal about consciousness?

Decoding perceptual contents from the prefrontal cortex (PFC) has been used to test rival theories of consciousness, but the evidence is ambiguous. Failures to decode from the PFC challenge cognitive theories like global workspace theory and higher-order monitoring theories, while successes seem to confirm them. However, PFC decoding shows both too much and too little: cognitive theories do not require PFC rerepresentation of perceptual contents, as pointers suffice, and decoding may reflect postperceptual cognitive representation, such as thoughts about perceptual contents, rather than conscious percepts themselves. This suggests that decoding evidence does not straightforwardly adjudicate between theories of consciousness.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Disputes between rival theories of consciousness have often centered on whether perceptual contents can be decoded from the prefrontal cortex (PFC). Failures to decode from the PFC are taken to challenge 'cognitive' theories of consciousness such as the global workspace theory and higher-order monitoring theories, and decoding successes have been taken to confirm these theories. However, PFC decoding shows both too much and too little. Too much because cognitive theories of consciousness do not need PFC rerepresentation of perceptual contents since pointers to perceptual representations suffice. Too little because there is evidence that PFC decoding of perceptual content reflects postperceptual cognitive representation, such as thoughts that have those perceptual contents rather than conscious percepts.