Merleau-Ponty and Derrida on Husserl’s Origin of Geometry

This paper challenges Jacques Derrida's criticisms of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of Edmund Husserl. It argues that Derrida was wrong to claim that Merleau-Ponty misinterpreted Husserl's letter to Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, and that Derrida's critique of Husserl's phenomenology does not apply equally to Merleau-Ponty's work. Using careful textual evidence, the author shows that Merleau-Ponty's late lectures on language develop a phenomenology that integrates perception and language while still prioritizing perception over eidetic essences or linguistic expression.

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Abstract

Abstract: A number of claims made by Derrida concerning Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of Husserl will be carefully considered and evaluated here. First, Derrida’s claim that Merleau-Ponty’s mis-interprets Husserl’s letter to Lévy-Bruhl will be challenged. Secondly, Derrida’s claim that his criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology can be applied just as well to Merleau-Ponty’s will be challenged. Thirdly, it is a careful consideration of textual evidence that will be used to support these challenges. Finally, Merleau-Ponty’s late lectures will take us back to the Lévy-Bruhl letter and finally to Merleau-Ponty’s own phenomenology of language, one that integrates perception and language and yet that still privileges not eidetic essences or linguistic expression but perception as its primary term.