Mind-Dependence in Berkeley and the Problem of Perception
Australasian Journal of Philosophy October 25, 2020 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2020.1826047 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Addiction |
| Citations | 7 |
| Key points | Argues that Berkeley's view of sensible qualities as mind-dependent ideas, rather than accidents inhering in substances, offers a solution to the problem of how perception can acquaint us with the mind-independent world. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT On the traditional picture, accidents must inhere in substances in order to exist. Berkeley famously argues that a particular class of accidents—the sensible qualities—are mere ideas—entities that depend for their existence on minds. To defend this view, Berkeley provides us with an elegant alternative to the traditional framework: sensible qualities depend on a mind, not in virtue of inhering in it, but in virtue of being perceived by it. This metaphysical insight, once correctly understood, gives us the resources to solve a central problem that still plagues the philosophy of perception—the problem of how, given the power of the mind to create phenomenally rich experiences, ordinary perception can nonetheless be said to acquaint us with the mind-independent world.