Enactivism and the Hegelian Stance on Intrinsic Purposiveness
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences July 7, 2022 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-022-09823-9 (opens in new tab) via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractHegel viewed organisms as intrinsically purposive natural systems, emphasizing their behavioral and cognitive capacities. This Hegelian stance, which develops a naturalized yet non-reductive account of natural purposiveness, is also present in enactivism, a contemporary theory of biological autonomy focused on cognition and the mind.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Philosophy |
| Citations | 13 |
| Key finding | Argues that Hegel's stance on biological purposiveness is reflected in enactivism, offering a naturalized yet non-reductive account of natural purposiveness. |
Abstract
We characterize Hegel’s stance on biological purposiveness as consisting in a twofold move, which conceives organisms as intrinsically purposive natural systems and focuses on their behavioral and cognitive abilities. We submit that a Hegelian stance is at play in enactivism, the branch of the contemporary theory of biological autonomy devoted to the study of cognition and the mind. What is at stake in the Hegelian stance is the elaboration of a naturalized, although non-reductive, understanding of natural purposiveness.