Enactivism and Heidegger: a Complicated Theoretical Union

Enactivism, which emphasizes embodied cognition, initially turned to Heidegger's philosophy for support, but encountered fundamental incompatibilities. The enactivist approach, rooted in Husserl's concept of intentionality, conflicts with Heidegger's non-intentional understanding of being-in-the-world. This article examines the difficulties in reconciling these frameworks and explores options for overcoming them. Natalie Depraz's interpretation of Heidegger's concept of Gelassenheit (releasement) is presented as one promising way to resolve the contradictions between enactivism and Heideggerian thought.

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Abstract

This article shows what difficulties are connected with the enactivist interpretation of Heidegger and what options can be found to overcome them. First of all, the epistemological attitude of enactivism is outlined. This attitued forced the enactivist theoreticians (i.e. Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson) to turn to the “cognitive” understanding of Heidegger. The rejection of cognitivism and connectionism as equally “disembodied” ways of understanding consciousness in favor of an “embodied” approach led enactivist theorists to turn to the phenomenological tradition and, in particular, to the cognitive interpretations of Heidegger. Secondly, the reasons for disappointment in the Heideggerian heritage, expressed by the theorists of enactivism, are considered. It is shown that the main reason for this disappointment was the basic incompatibility of the enactivist approach to consciousness, based on the Husserlian concept of intentionality, with Heidegger's approach. Natalie Depraz' non-intentional approach based on her interpretation of the concept of Gelassenheit is named as an example of overcoming the contradictions that arise in enactivism.