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Enactivizing dialectics: from individual to social normativity and back

Andrea Gambarotto, T. van Es

Topoi October 23, 2025 DOI: 10.1007/s11245-025-10261-w (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that enactivism can address the complexity of social cognition only by integrating dialectical tools, specifically Hegelian recognition and expressivism, into the theory of the embodied mind. Proposes that social norms emerge as historically sedimented processes of collective co-regulation rooted in embodied sensorimotor interactions, acquiring an objective, constraining character while remaining open to revision.

Abstract

This paper examines the relation between embodiment and sociality within the enactive approach, highlighting the continuity between biological autonomy and social normativity. The central claim is that, while enactivism offers the conceptual resources to address the complexity of social cognition, doing so requires the integration of dialectical tools into the theory of the embodied mind. For this, we turn to the Hegelian notions of recognition and expressivism, emphasizing the recursive relations between individual and social embodiment. From this perspective, social norms emerge as historically sedimented processes of collective co-regulation rooted in embodied sensorimotor interactions. Once established, such norms acquire an objective character, confronting individuals as ecological constraints, while remaining open to revision and transformation. Social norms thus preserve continuity with their embodied origins while instituting novel forms of collective co-regulation.