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On the Possibility of Pure Consciousness

Mark B. Woodhouse

The Problem of Pure Consciousness March 29, 1990 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780195059809.003.0010 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Citations 6
Key points Argues that there are no logical or phenomenological considerations that rule out the existence of pure consciousness.

Abstract

Abstract Throughout recorded history and across major cultural and religious barriers many persons have claimed to have, had experiences of “pure” consciousness, that is, of a consciousness free of content and intention. Major spiritual traditions are built in significant ways around the existence of these experiences and the desirability of achieving them. Yet many philosophical and scientific traditions, especially in the West, deny not only their existence, but also their possibility. Consciousness often is conceived in ways that rule out the possibility of a pure state on a priori grounds. My purpose in this essay is to show that there are no logical or, to a lesser extent, phenomenological considerations that rule out the existence of pure consciousness.