Fathoming the Depth of Awareness
Ori Beck
Philosophia December 5, 2025 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-025-00932-8 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Philosophy of language Revelation Philosophy of science Relation database Problem of universals Qualia Quality philosophy Epistemology Self-awareness Perception Character mathematics Theory of mind Cognitive science |
| Key points | Argues that Mehta's theory of deep awareness is false on three grounds: revelation is false, the E theory is false, and deep awareness does not partly constitute phenomenal character. |
Abstract
Abstract Neil Mehta puts forward a pluralist theory of conscious perception, on which to consciously perceive is to deploy not just one, but two distinct kinds of sensory awareness in concert. Here I present three reservations regarding one of these kinds awareness - deep awareness. First, Mehta introduces deep awareness as a relation whose deployment explains the putative fact that conscious states unerringly reveal to us a substantial portion of the essences of sensory quality universals (“revelation” and “infallibility” theses). I both undermine a part of Mehta’s defense of revelation and infallibility, and argue that revelation is false. Second, the main theoretical purpose for which Mehta introduces deep awareness is to explain the presence of hard problems of consciousness. Mehta calls this explanation “the E theory”. I argue that this theory is false. Third, a central upshot of Mehta’s theory of deep awareness is that to have an experience in which you are deeply aware of a universal U is to have an experience whose phenomenal character is partly constituted by U. I argue that this is false.
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