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Awareness

Casey O'Callaghan

A Multisensory Philosophy of Perception December 3, 2019 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833703.003.0004 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that perceptual awareness of an object or feature is sometimes constitutively and irreducibly multisensory, because exercising multisensory perceptual capacities can make otherwise imperceptible features available to conscious subjects for thought, reasoning, and rational action. Concludes that multisensory perceptual awareness cannot be fully captured in terms of sense-specific awareness.

Abstract

Abstract Perceptual capacities need not be reflected as such in perceptual consciousness. Thus, a subject could possess multisensory perceptual capacities while perceptual consciousness remains sense specific. For instance, a subject could detect and differentiate novel intermodal features without corresponding, irreducibly multisensory perceptual awareness. In response, this chapter argues that perceptual awareness of an object or feature sometimes is constitutively, irreducibly multisensory. In particular, it argues that the exercise of multisensory perceptual capacities can serve to make features that are not otherwise perceptible available to conscious subjects for use in thought, reasoning, and rational action. Multisensory perception thereby fixes which features are occurrently accessible to conscious perceiving subjects. The implication is that multisensory perceptual awareness cannot fully be captured in terms of sense-specific awareness.

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