Enactivism's Vision: Neurocognitive Basis or Neurocognitively Baseless?
Charles Wallis, Wayne Wright
Oxford University Press eBooks September 2, 2009 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195304787.003.0012 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 5 |
| Key points | Argues that enactivism's revolutionary aims and its understanding of vision science are not compelling, and that even modest enactivism faces serious empirical and conceptual problems. The author also contends that enactivism has neglected relevant areas of neuroscience. |
Abstract
Abstract This article aims to clarify the central commitment and the claimed advantages of enactivism, a theoretical approach for understanding the mind. The analysis reveals that there is no compelling reason to embrace either the enactivists' aim of completely revolutionizing vision science or their understanding of the character of that new vision science. There are also numerous serious empirical and conceptual problems for even the more modest enactivism. This article discusses enactivist responses to empirical evidence cited as posing difficulties for enactivism and considers areas of neuroscience deemed highly relevant but that remain unconsidered by enactivism.
Citations in the library
Cites 8
- Ten Problems of Consciousness The MIT Press eBooks November 17, 1995
- The Experimental Induction of Out-of-Body Experiences Science August 23, 2007
- Out‐of‐body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin Brain January 15, 2004
- Linking Out-of-Body Experience and Self Processing to Mental Own-Body Imagery at the Temporoparietal Junction Journal of Neuroscience January 19, 2005
- Finding out about filling-in: a guide to perceptual completion for visual science and the philosophy of perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 1998
and 3 more in the library