Enactivism's Vision: Neurocognitive Basis or Neurocognitively Baseless?
Oxford University Press eBooks September 2, 2009 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195304787.003.0012 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 5 |
| Key points | Argues that enactivism's revolutionary aims and its understanding of vision science are not compelling, and that even modest enactivism faces serious empirical and conceptual problems. The author also contends that enactivism has neglected relevant areas of neuroscience. |
Abstract
Abstract This article aims to clarify the central commitment and the claimed advantages of enactivism, a theoretical approach for understanding the mind. The analysis reveals that there is no compelling reason to embrace either the enactivists' aim of completely revolutionizing vision science or their understanding of the character of that new vision science. There are also numerous serious empirical and conceptual problems for even the more modest enactivism. This article discusses enactivist responses to empirical evidence cited as posing difficulties for enactivism and considers areas of neuroscience deemed highly relevant but that remain unconsidered by enactivism.