The Hard Problem of Intentionality for Radical Enactive Cognition
Synthese April 21, 2026 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-026-05559-0 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractRadical Enactive Cognition attempts to explain basic intentionality—called Ur-intentionality—without mental representations, using only teleofunctional resources like information-as-covariance and natural selection. This paper argues that this approach fails. It identifies two problems: the Determinacy Problem, concerning how information picks out specific objects, and the Distality Problem, concerning how it relates to distant causes. Teleofunctionalism also risks reducing Ur-intentionality to stimulus-response behaviorism, which Radical Enactivism itself rejects as non-cognitive. The paper develops an enactive stimulus-response account showing teleofunctional mechanisms can explain adaptive behavior without intentionality. These issues pose a serious, overlooked challenge to non-representational, selectionist theories of cognition—the Hard Problem of Intentionality.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Enactivism Intentionality Philosophy of science Philosophy of language |
| Key finding | Argues that teleofunctional resources cannot ground content-free intentionality, identifying the Determinacy Problem and Distality Problem that lead to a collapse into stimulus-response behaviorism, posing the Hard Problem of Intentionality for non-representational theories. |
Abstract
Abstract Radical Enactive Cognition challenges teleosemantic representationalism while proposing a naturalistic, content-free account of basic intentionality – “Ur-intentionality” – based solely on teleofunctional resources such as information-as-covariance and natural selection, a view known as Teleosemiotics. This paper argues that this appropriation is insufficient to ground content-free intentionality. Two problems for functional information-as-covariance are identified: the Determinacy Problem and the Distality Problem. Furthermore, teleofunctionalism fails to prevent Ur-intentionality from collapsing into a form of stimulus-response behaviorism, which Radical Enactivism itself deems non-cognitive. An enactive stimulus-response account is developed to show that teleofunctional mechanisms can explain adaptive behavior without invoking intentionality. The paper concludes that these issues pose a serious and previously overlooked challenge to non-representational, selectionist theories of cognition – the Hard Problem of Intentionality – and points to possible ways to deal with the problem.