On Ur-intentionality
Ludovic Soutif, Carlos Márquez
Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea October 2, 2024 DOI: 10.26512/rfmc.v9i2.42920 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that stripping teleosemantics of representationalist commitments results in explanatory loss for basic cognition, and proposes 'metaphysically non-committal content-ascriptivism' as an alternative. |
Abstract
Starting from Brentano’s classical characterization of intentionality, we review the radical enactivist proposal about basic cognition and show that the underlying assumption that stripping teleosemantics of its representationalist commitments results in no explanatory loss is unwarranted. Significant features of basic cognition are lost, or so we argue, with the RECtification of teleosemantics that are retrieved by means of an alternative dubbed metaphysically non-committal content-ascriptivism.