On Ur-intentionality
Ludovic Soutif, Carlos Márquez
Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea October 2, 2024 DOI: 10.26512/rfmc.v9i2.42920 (opens in new tab) via DOAJ
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe paper argues against radical enactivism's claim that teleosemantics can be stripped of representationalist commitments without explanatory loss. Starting from Brentano's characterization of intentionality, the authors contend that significant features of basic cognition are lost under the radical enactivist revision. They propose an alternative called metaphysically non-committal content-ascriptivism, which retrieves these lost features without the ontological baggage of traditional representationalism.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that stripping teleosemantics of representationalist commitments results in explanatory loss for basic cognition, and proposes 'metaphysically non-committal content-ascriptivism' as an alternative. |
Abstract
Starting from Brentano’s classical characterization of intentionality, we review the radical enactivist proposal about basic cognition and show that the underlying assumption that stripping teleosemantics of its representationalist commitments results in no explanatory loss is unwarranted. Significant features of basic cognition are lost, or so we argue, with the RECtification of teleosemantics that are retrieved by means of an alternative dubbed metaphysically non-committal content-ascriptivism.