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Meaning, Alternatives, and the Adjudicative Function: A Distilled SCT Expression

Jamie Morris

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) May 30, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20464883 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Cognition Function biology Meaning existential Consciousness Expression computer science Metaphysics Epistemology Cognitive psychology Workspace Cognitive science Object grammar Interpretation philosophy
Key points Proposes that cognition includes a distinct adjudicative function concerned with preserving alternative accessibility within a meaning-landscape, a function not exhausted by the truth or utility of those alternatives.

Abstract

Description: Meaning, Alternatives, and the Adjudicative Function Core question: Why does recognized error feel qualitatively different from ordinary failure? Central claim: A system can only be wrong if alternatives existed. Meaning itself depends on the maintained possibility of relating distinctions in more than one way. Cognition therefore includes a distinct function — the adjudicative function — concerned with preserving alternative accessibility within a meaning-landscape, a function not exhausted by the truth or utility of those alternatives. Phenomenological anchor: The emotional weight of error reflects the withdrawal of endorsement from a previously trusted distinction — consciousness transitioning from "yes" to "no" from within. What the paper is not: It is not a metaphysical claim about reality, not a neural implementation, not a formal theory of alternatives, and not a complete cognitive architecture. It is a short conceptual essay establishing a falsifiable architectural claim. Falsification: If all apparent alternative-preservation reduces without remainder to prediction-error minimization, global broadcasting, or sensorimotor coordination, the adjudicative function would be unnecessary. Contribution: A distinct, testable proposal about a cognitive function that existing frameworks (predictive processing, Global Workspace theory, enactivism) do not treat as primary. Audience: Cognitive scientists, philosophers of mind, consciousness researchers, and theorists of learning, error, and deliberation.