The Epistemic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.22 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the epistemic view, which posits ignorance of something relevant to the hard problem of consciousness, faces objections that it either identifies no relevant ignorance or fails to contribute to solving the problem. |
Abstract
According to the epistemic view of the hard problem of consciousness, we are ignorant at least for the time being of something important and relevant when it comes to the hard problem, and this fact has a significant implication for its solution. This chapter outlines one version of the view before considering two objections. The first is that, while we may be ignorant of various features of the world, we are not ignorant of any feature that is relevant to the hard problem. The second is that, even if the epistemic approach is true, properly understood it is not an answer to the hard problem; indeed, it is no contribution to that problem at all. The chapter concludes with some brief reflections on why the epistemic approach, despite its attractiveness, remains a minority view in contemporary philosophy of mind.