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Contemplative Practices and Soteriological Epistemology: Carrying Forward the Phenomenological Project

Ashok Zaman

Journal of Contemplative Studies November 17, 2025 DOI: 10.57010/azah7178 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Meditation Philosophy of mind
Keywords Contemplative practices Cognition Felt sense Soteriology Epistemology
Key points Argues that mindfulness and Phenomenology share an epistemic concern with knowledge of reality, and that Gendlin's experiential Phenomenology shows how contemplative practice can advance the phenomenological project.

Abstract

According to Odysseus Stone and Dan Zahavi’s view, canonical Phenomenology is specifically concerned with analyzing the mind-world dyad and its theoretical implications for philosophy and science. Despite widespread adoption in therapy and research, they claim that mindfulness is ambiguously described as the practice of bare attention and nonjudgment, either on perceptual objects or subjective acts. Thus, comparisons that liken Phenomenology to mindfulness are inaccurate because mindfulness is primarily concerned with how we experience the world. Furthermore, such comparisons have misconstrued Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological attitude and method of epoché and reduction, resulting in a lax usage of the term “Phenomenology.” However, I argue that within their originating soteriological milieu, meditative practices like mindfulness are no less concerned with knowledge of reality than Phenomenology. Both aim at knowledge that moves beyond mere words. Ambiguities in mindfulness discourse notwithstanding, Gendlin’s experiential Phenomenology demonstrates that we can find precise epistemic ground for philosophy in “implicit” experience—a form of knowing I liken to prajñā, or higher cognition, that practices like Buddhist mindfulness are said to cultivate. Contrary to Stone and Zahavi’s denial, drawing from Gendlin’s philosophical methodology of felt-sensing, I thus contend that recovering the contemplative element of practice in philosophical thinking cannot but carry the phenomenological project forward.

Comparable studies

Other theoretical and historical papers on meditation, most cited first.

Study Year Design Participants
Mindfulness: A proposed operational definition. 2004 Theoretical or philosophical paper
Mechanisms of mindfulness 2005 Theoretical or philosophical paper
How Does Mindfulness Meditation Work? Proposing Mechanisms of Action From a Conceptual and Neural Perspective 2011 Theoretical or philosophical paper
Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy for depression 2006 Theoretical or philosophical paper
Self-awareness, self-regulation, and self-transcendence (S-ART): a framework for understanding the neurobiological mechanisms of mindfulness 2012 Theoretical or philosophical paper

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Meditation Philosophy of mind Buddhism