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Pluralist neurophenomenology: a reply to Lopes

Jeff Yoshimi

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences September 1, 2025 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-023-09892-4 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Citations 4
Key points Argues that multiple theoretical frameworks—symbolic, dynamical systems, and connectionist—are mutually compatible and can be used together in neurophenomenology to study consciousness and its relationship to neural activity.

Abstract

Abstract Lopes (2021) has argued against my use of neural networks and dynamical systems theory in neurophenomenology. Responding to his argument provides an opportunity to articulate a pluralist approach to neurophenomenology, according to which multiple theoretical frameworks—symbolic, dynamical systems, connectionist, etc.—can be used to study consciousness and its relationship to neural activity. Each type of analysis is best suited to specific phenomena, but they are mutually compatible and can inform and constrain one another in non-trivial ways. I use historical and conceptual arguments to elaborate on this type of pluralism as it applies to cognitive science, phenomenology, and neurophenomenology.

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