The intuition that phenomenal consciousness is not a physical property is central to debates about consciousness. Some theorists treat this intuition as a psychological illusion, while others see it as a genuine cognitive problem. This article argues that neither approach is satisfactory and presents a new argument that the intuition of dualism is a genuine epistemic problem. The difficulty arises because psychophysical identities cannot be deduced from physical truths alone, creating an epistemic gap that cannot be dismissed as mere error.
Frank Jackson's knowledge argument claims that Mary, who knows all physical facts while living in a black-and-white world, learns something new when she sees red, which would refute physicalism. However, physicalism can be preserved even if the argument is accepted. Physical computer systems with a specific structure and complexity cannot predict their own sensory information, creating decision-related unpredictability for certain types of sensory data. This analysis offers a physicalist and computationalist explanation of qualia, taking a charitable view of the concept.
Contemplation is not immediately obvious in Michael Willmann's paintings, but the nature of his work can both encourage contemplative practice and serve as a visual example of it. The article explores several ways to understand contemplation as exemplified in Willmann's art, considering the role of visual representations in prayer practices of the time and changes in the idea of contemplation after St. Ignatius Loyola's Spiritual Exercises (1548). The account avoids categorical judgments, instead inviting personal experience of Willmann's art within its historical context.