Is phenomenal consciousness really a special case in science?

The standard view that higher-level properties are grounded in micro-physical properties fails even in physics and chemistry, so arguments that phenomenal consciousness is a special exception to physicalism are misguided. The paper introduces a general notion of grounding, then examines the zombie and knowledge arguments against physicalism about consciousness. It shows that in particle physics and chemistry, the expected reductive relation does not hold, undermining the claim that consciousness is uniquely problematic. The authors propose an alternative way to naturalize phenomenal consciousness within the natural world.

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Abstract

In the metaphysics of science, it is often held that higher-level properties are grounded in micro-physical properties. According to many philosophers, however, phenomenal consciousness resists this view. Many famous arguments in Philosophy of Mind have been given to reject this notion. In this paper, we argue that there is something odd about the idea that phenomenal consciousness is a special case in science and give a constructive proposal on how consciousness can fit in the natural world. To do so, we will first introduce a general notion of what grounding is. Then, we will briefly explain how the arguments for the specialness of phenomenal consciousness work by considering two famous examples, namely the zombie and the knowledge argument. In a further step, we will briefly discuss two cases from other areas in science, i.e., in particle physics and chemistry. We will demonstrate that the standard view about the reductive relation does not hold, even in these paradigm cases of the natural sciences. If what we argue is true, we think that most arguments from phenomenal consciousness cannot defeat physicalism per se. Finally, we will introduce an alternative way to naturalize phenomenal consciousness.