The 'Problem of the Rock' (PoR) is a well-known objection to Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousness, which hold that a mental state is conscious only when accompanied by a higher-order mental state about it. The objection claims that this view would also imply a rock is conscious if a higher-order mental state were directed at it. This paper argues that the objection confuses two grammatically distinct ways of attributing consciousness. Once this equivocation fallacy is avoided, the Problem of the Rock either misrepresents HO theories or yields a conclusion that is not actually problematic.
Qualia realists believe that the phenomenal character of experience is a non-representational property called qualia, while representationalists argue it is a representational property, denying qualia in that sense. The transparency of qualia to introspection seems to support representationalism. Sydney Shoemaker proposes a middle ground, moderate qualia realism, claiming phenomenal character is representational but determined by non-representational qualia, and that qualia are indirectly introspectible. The author argues that Shoemaker's view and his account of indirect introspection fail to provide a plausible solution to the problem of transparency for qualia realists.