Shoemaker’s moderate qualia realism and the transparency of qualia

Qualia realists believe that the phenomenal character of experience is a non-representational property called qualia, while representationalists argue it is a representational property, denying qualia in that sense. The transparency of qualia to introspection seems to support representationalism. Sydney Shoemaker proposes a middle ground, moderate qualia realism, claiming phenomenal character is representational but determined by non-representational qualia, and that qualia are indirectly introspectible. The author argues that Shoemaker's view and his account of indirect introspection fail to provide a plausible solution to the problem of transparency for qualia realists.

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Abstract

Abstract Qualia realists hold that experience’s phenomenal character is a non-representational property of experience, what they call qualia . Representationalists hold that phenomenal character is a representational property of experience — there are no qualia (in this particular sense of the word). The transparency of qualia to introspection would seem to count as reason for rejecting qualia realism and favouring representationalism. Sydney Shoemaker defends a middle ground, call it moderate qualia realism , which seems to provide a response to the problem of transparency that in consistent with qualia realism. According to this view, while phenomenal character is a representational property of experience, it is determined by certain non-representational properties of experience, namely qualia. Shoemaker explains the apparent transparency of qualia by claiming that, while qualia are not directly introspectible, they are indirectly introspectible. I argue that neither Shoemaker’s moderate qualia realism nor his account of indirect introspection provide the qualia realist with a plausible solution to the problem of transparency.