The Problem of the Rock and the Grammar of Consciousness
Disputatio May 1, 2017 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2017-0024 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe 'Problem of the Rock' (PoR) is a well-known objection to Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousness, which hold that a mental state is conscious only when accompanied by a higher-order mental state about it. The objection claims that this view would also imply a rock is conscious if a higher-order mental state were directed at it. This paper argues that the objection confuses two grammatically distinct ways of attributing consciousness. Once this equivocation fallacy is avoided, the Problem of the Rock either misrepresents HO theories or yields a conclusion that is not actually problematic.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Fallacy Argument complex analysis Consciousness Mental state Equivocation |
| Key finding | Argues that the Problem of the Rock objection to Higher-Order theories of consciousness is invalid due to a grammatical equivocation in attributions of consciousness. |
Abstract
Abstract The “Problem of the Rock” (PoR) is a famous objection to Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousness. According to PoR, the HO theorists’ claim that a mental state is conscious iff there is a higher-order mental state about it implies that a rock is also conscious iff there is a higher-order mental state about it. In this paper I show that this argument confuses two grammatically distinct attributions of consciousness, and that if the consequent equivocation fallacy is avoided, PoR is either a straw man argument or has an unproblematic conclusion.