Skip to content

The Problem of the Rock and the Grammar of Consciousness

Lajos L. Brons

Disputatio May 1, 2017 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2017-0024 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Fallacy Argument complex analysis Consciousness Mental state Equivocation State computer science Attribution Order exchange Epistemology Cognitive science
Key points Argues that the Problem of the Rock objection to Higher-Order theories of consciousness is invalid due to a grammatical equivocation in attributions of consciousness.

Abstract

Abstract The “Problem of the Rock” (PoR) is a famous objection to Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousness. According to PoR, the HO theorists’ claim that a mental state is conscious iff there is a higher-order mental state about it implies that a rock is also conscious iff there is a higher-order mental state about it. In this paper I show that this argument confuses two grammatically distinct attributions of consciousness, and that if the consequent equivocation fallacy is avoided, PoR is either a straw man argument or has an unproblematic conclusion.