Awareness of Self Attention
Avant January 1, 2016 DOI: 10.26913/70302016.0109.0002 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe text argues that internal, organic sensations form the basis of consciousness of life and self and are integral to every feeling. This explains the natural linguistic affinity between feelings and self-awareness, as seen in expressions like "sense of self" in English, "sentiment du moi" in French, and "das Ichgefuhl" in German, which feel more fitting than terms involving representation or mental imagery. However, the self is not itself a feeling because no feeling is as constant or recurrent as the self. Nonetheless, the self is closer to emotive states than to representations or mental images.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Cognitive psychology |
| Key finding | Argues that the self is not a feeling but is closer to emotive states than to representations or mental images, grounded in the linguistic and phenomenological affinity between feelings and self-consciousness. |
Abstract
Internal sensations, especially organic ones, are not only the foundation of our consciousness of life and self but also an integral part of each feeling. This is probably the origin of the genuine affinity between feelings and consciousness of life and self, an affinity that manifests itself even in speech. Indeed, the expression "sense of self" is more natural than saying "representing" or even "imagining one's self". It is also easier and neater to talk in French about "sentiment du moi" than "representation du moi"; the expression "das Ichgefhl" is less grating than "die Ichvorstellung", the latter being rather used to mean the conceived self as opposed to the self of which one is conscious all the time. The self is not a feeling, however, if only because there are no feelings that would be equally constant or, to be more precise, that would recur with equal constancy. Even so, we can say it is closer to emotive states than to any representation or mental image.