This article critiques the anti-anthropocentrism of new ontologies developed in the context of the Anthropocene, such as object-oriented ontology (Harman) and speculative materialism (Meillassoux). While these movements decenter the human and emphasize the autonomy of knowledge and nature, the article argues that they lapse into a reductive framework by weakening the subject, paradoxically risking a return of anthropocentrism in a different form. To overcome this problem, the article presents Schelling's philosophy of nature as an alternative. Schelling conceives nature as a creative and productive process, grounding the subject-object distinction as a result of this productivity.
This article evaluates embodied cognition theory, which has gained prominence in philosophy of mind since the 1990s. It aims to overcome the traditional mind-body dualism by viewing consciousness not merely as a brain-centered process but as a holistic interaction of body, environment, and actions. The article first highlights the Cartesian roots of classical philosophy of mind, which positions the mind as an abstract, body-independent subject. It then discusses the primordial connection between body and consciousness through phenomenology, especially Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of perception.