IS PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS NECESSARY FOR MINDREADING?

Abstract

I will argue that if subjective experience is a prerequisite for mindreading, then Large Language Models and philosophical zombies either have different ways of mindreading or they cannot partake in understanding others. I will explore how this impacts recent debates on Large Language Models (LLMs). At first I will explore the consequences following from the assumption that phenomenal consciousness is not required for mindreading, conceived as solely based on behaviour interpretability. I will analyze two candidates for ToM: Simulation Theory and Theory-Theory. I argue the latter would allow for philosophical zombies and LLMs to both exhibit Theory of Mind. Simulation Theory relies on introspection, simulation and imagination. Simulation entails replicability. For LLMs and philosophical zombies alike, subjective experience seems, at least prima facie, to be missing. So the replicated mental state would have to be incomplete; I end by debating whether phenomenal aspects of the simulated mental state are necessary for attribution.