7 papers in the library · 2 citations · publishing 2000-2026
Mind & Language June 16, 2026 Robert D. Rupert
This essay argues for a mixed‐resource approach to scientific modeling and applies it to questions in philosophy of mind. A mixed‐resource approach makes use of whatever resources—at whatever scale, from whatever academic discipline—seem useful, freely combining such varied resources in individual models. The success of mixed‐resource modeling challenges the widely shared commitment to a...
Mind & Language April 25, 2026 S. Rappe, S. Wilkinson
The idea that cognition involves dialogic interchange between mutually influencing “voices” has long featured in psychology and philosophy. While dialogic structure is most explicit in inner speech, some authors have argued that other types of mental activity can be (or always are) dialogic. We introduce two dimensions of dialogism, strength and depth, and characterize a particularly deep form...
Mind & Language May 26, 2025 James D. Grayot 2 citations
The rapid growth of 4E‐cognition has led to increased skepticism about the role of internal representations in understanding complex cognitive tasks. Critics challenge the idea of representation‐hungry cognition (RHC), rejecting the notion that thinking about absent or abstract objects requires internal representations. Despite criticisms, I argue that RHC remains relevant to understanding what...
Mind & Language September 1, 2022 Richard Heersmink
In this paper, I describe how artifacts and autobiographical memory are integrated into new systemic wholes, allowing us to remember our personal past in a more reliable and detailed manner. After discussing some empirical work on lifelogging technology, I elaborate on the dimension of autobiographical dependency, which is the degree to which we depend on an object to be able to remember a...
Mind & Language February 1, 2010 Shannon Spaulding
Recently, philosophers and psychologists defending the embodied cognition research program have offered arguments against mindreading as a general model of our social understanding. The embodied cognition arguments are of two kinds: those that challenge the developmental picture of mindreading and those that challenge the alleged ubiquity of mindreading. Together, these two kinds of arguments,...
Mind & Language March 1, 2001 Andy Clark
A suitable project for the new Millenium is to radically reconfigure our image of human rationality. Such a project is already underway, within the Cognitive Sciences, under the umbrellas of work in Situated Cognition, Distributed and De‐centralized Cognition, Real‐world Robotics and Artificial Life. Such approaches, however, are often criticized for giving certain aspects of rationality too...
Mind & Language November 1, 2000 Mark McCullagh
I offer a philosophically well‐motivated work‐around for a problem that George Bealer (‘Self‐consciousness’, Philosophical Review v. 106, 1997) has identified, which he claims is fatal to functionalism. The problem concerns how to generate a satisfactory Ramsey sentence of a psychological theory in which mental predicates occur within the scopes of other mental predicates. My central claim is...