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JoLMA

ISSN 2723-9640

4 papers in the library · 20 citations · publishing 2020

Papers

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4E Cognition and the Spectrum of Aesthetic Experience

JoLMA December 9, 2020 Mia Burnett, Shaun Gallagher 17 citations

We review 4E (embodied, embedded, extended and enactive) approaches to the analysis of art and aesthetic experience. We argue that extended mind analyses that focus on tool use miss important aspects, and that it requires 4 or more E’s to address the broad spectrum of aesthetic experiences that correlate to the broad variety of artistic genres. We develop an enactive, affordance-based approach...

Enactivism and Normativity The Case of Aesthetic Gestures

JoLMA December 9, 2020 Anna Boncompagni 2 citations

Enactivist approaches claim that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. An ongoing challenge for these approaches is the problem of accounting for normativity while avoiding overly reductionist outcomes. This article examines a few proposed solutions, including agent-environment dynamics, participatory sense-making, radical enactivism, the...

Raw Cognition Rhythms as Dynamic Constraints

JoLMA December 9, 2020 Carlos Vara Sánchez 1 citation

There is increasing evidence that the rhythmic interactions between intrinsic oscillators both in the body and in the brain play a constitutive role in cognition. However, the mechanisms and extent of these interactions are yet to be fully understood. In this article, I will contend that a notion of rhythm as an open entrainment can be useful for enactive approaches to different aspects of...

4E’s Are Too Many Why Enactive World-Making Does Not Need The Extended Mind Thesis

JoLMA December 9, 2020 Alfonsina Scarinzi

4E’s cognition – embodied, embedded, enacted, extended – replaces the cognitivist notion of world-mirroring with an active process of world-making: cognition needs no mental representation and is distributed over body, brain and environment. In recent years, the remark that extended cognition is not enactive and that the embodied approach to cognition fails to provide a definition of body raise...